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AI That Evolves in the Wild

[8.14.19]

I’m interested not in domesticated AI—the stuff that people are trying to sell. I'm interested in wild AI—AI that evolves in the wild. I’m a naturalist, so that’s the interesting thing to me. Thirty-four years ago there was a meeting just like this in which Stanislaw Ulam said to everybody in the room—they’re all mathematicians—"What makes you so sure that mathematical logic corresponds to the way we think?" It’s a higher-level symptom. It’s not how the brain works. All those guys knew fully well that the brain was not fundamentally logical.

We’re in a transition similar to the first Macy Conferences. The Teleological Society, which became the Cybernetics Group, started in 1943 at a time of transition, when the world was full of analog electronics at the end of World War II. We had built all these vacuum tubes and suddenly there was free time to do something with them, so we decided to make digital computers. And we had the digital revolution. We’re now at exactly the same tipping point in history where we have all this digital equipment, all these machines. Most of the time they’re doing nothing except waiting for the next single instruction. The funny thing is, now it’s happening without people intentionally. There we had a very deliberate group of people who said, "Let’s build digital machines." Now, I believe we are building analog computers in a very big way, but nobody’s organizing it; it’s just happening.

GEORGE DYSON is a historian of science and technology and author of Darwin Among the Machines and Turing’s Cathedral. George Dyson's Edge Bio Page


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The Language of Mind

[8.8.19]

Will every possible intelligent system somehow experience itself or model itself as having a mind? Is the language of mind going to be inevitable in an AI system that has some kind of model of itself? If you’ve just got an AI system that's modeling the world and not bringing itself into the equation, then it may need the language of mind to talk about other people if it wants to model them and model itself from the third-person perspective. If we’re working towards artificial general intelligence, it's natural to have AIs with models of themselves, particularly with introspective self-models, where they can know what’s going on in some sense from the first-person perspective.

Say you do something that negatively affects an AI, something that in an ordinary human would correspond to damage and pain. Your AI is going to say, "Please don’t do that. That’s very bad." Introspectively, it’s a model that recognizes someone has caused one of those states it calls pain. Is it going to be an inevitable consequence of introspective self-models in AI that they start to model themselves as having something like consciousness? My own suspicion is that there's something about the mechanisms of self-modeling and introspection that are going to naturally lead to these intuitions, where an AI will model itself as being conscious. The next step is whether an AI of this kind is going to naturally experience consciousness as somehow puzzling, as something that potentially is hard to square with basic underlying mechanisms and hard to explain.

DAVID CHALMERS is University Professor of Philosophy and Neural Science and co-director of the Center for Mind, Brain, and Consciousness at New York University. He is best known for his work on consciousness, including his formulation of the "hard problem" of consciousness. David Chalmers's Edge Bio Page


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Morphogenesis for the Design of Design

[7.31.19]

As we work on the self-reproducing assembler and writing software that looks like hardware that respects geometry, they meet in morphogenesis. This is the thing I’m most excited about right now: the design of design. Your genome doesn’t store anywhere that you have five fingers. It stores a developmental program, and when you run it, you get five fingers. It’s one of the oldest parts of the genome. Hox genes are an example. It’s essentially the only part of the genome where the spatial order matters. It gets read off as a program, and the program never represents the physical thing it’s constructing. The morphogenes are a program that specifies morphogens that do things like climb gradients and symmetry break; it never represents the thing it’s constructing, but the morphogens then following the morphogenes give rise to you.

What’s going on in morphogenesis, in part, is compression. So, a billion bases can specify a trillion cells, but the more interesting thing that’s going on is almost anything you perturb in the genome is either inconsequential or fatal. The morphogenes are a curated search space where rearranging them is interesting—you go from gills to wings to flippers. The heart of success in machine learning, however you represent it, is function representation. The real progress in machine learning is learning representation. How you search hasn’t changed all that much, but how you represent search has. These morphogenes are a beautiful way to represent design. Technology today doesn’t do it. Technology today generally doesn’t distinguish genotype and phenotype in the sense that you explicitly represent what you’re designing. In morphogenesis, you never represent the thing you’re designing; it's done in a beautifully abstract way. So, for these self-reproducing assemblers, what we’re building is morphogenesis for the design of design. Rather than a combinatorial search over billions of degrees of freedom, you search over these developmental programs. This is one of the core research questions we’re looking at.

NEIL GERSHENFELD is director of MIT’s Center for Bits and Atoms; founder of the global fab lab network; the author of FAB; and co-author (with Alan Gershenfeld & Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld) of Designing Reality. Neil Gershenfeld's Edge Bio Page


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Ecology of Intelligence

[7.23.19]

I don't think a singularity is imminent, although there has been quite a bit of talk about it. I don't think the prospect of artificial intelligence outstripping human intelligence is imminent because the engineering substrate just isn’t there, and I don't see the immediate prospects of getting there. I haven’t said much about quantum computing, other people will, but if you’re waiting for quantum computing to create a singularity, you’re misguided. That crossover, fortunately, will take decades, if not centuries.

There’s this tremendous drive for intelligence, but there will be a long period of coexistence in which there will be an ecology of intelligence. Humans will become enhanced in different ways and relatively trivial ways with smartphones and access to the Internet, but also the integration will become more intimate as time goes on. Younger people who interact with these devices from childhood will be cyborgs from the very beginning. They will think in different ways than current adults do.

FRANK WILCZEK is the Herman Feshbach Professor of Physics at MIT, recipient of the 2004 Nobel Prize in physics, and author of A Beautiful Question: Finding Nature’s Deep DesignFrank Wilczek's Edge Bio Pag


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Humans: Doing More With Less

[7.16.19]

Imagine a superintelligent system with far more computational resources than us mere humans that’s trying to make inferences about what the humans who are surrounding it—which it thinks of as cute little pets—are trying to achieve so that it is then able to act in a way that is consistent with what those human beings might want. That system needs to be able to simulate what an agent with greater constraints on its cognitive resources should be doing, and it should be able to make inferences, like the fact that we’re not able to calculate the zeros of the Riemann zeta function or discover a cure for cancer. It doesn’t mean we’re not interested in those things; it’s just a consequence of the cognitive limitations that we have.

As a parent of two small children, this is a problem that I face all the time, which is trying to figure out what my kids want, kids who are operating in an entirely different mode of computation, and having to build a kind of internal model of how a toddler’s mind works such that it’s possible to unravel that and work out that there’s a particular motivation for the very strange pattern of actions that they’re taking.

Both from the perspective of understanding human cognition and from the perspective of being able to build AI systems that can understand human cognition, it’s desirable for us to have a better model of how rational agents should act if those rational agents have limited cognitive resources. That’s something that I’ve been working on for the last few years. We have an approach to thinking about this that we call resource rationality. And this is closely related to similar ideas that are being proposed in the artificial intelligence literature. One of these ideas is the notion of bounded optimality, proposed by Stuart Russell.

TOM GRIFFITHS is Henry R. Luce Professor of Information, Technology, Consciousness, and Culture at Princeton University. He is co-author (with Brian Christian) of Algorithms to Live By. Tom Griffiths's Edge Bio Page


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A Separate Kind of Intelligence

[7.10.19]

Back in 1950, Turing argued that for a genuine AI we might do better by simulating a child’s mind than an adult’s. This insight has particular resonance given recent work on "life history" theory in evolutionary biology—the developmental trajectory of a species, particularly the length of its childhood, is highly correlated with adult intelligence and flexibility across a wide range of species. This trajectory is also reflected in brain development, with its distinctive transition from early proliferation to later pruning. I’ve argued that this developmental pattern reflects a distinctive evolutionary way of resolving explore-exploit tensions that bedevil artificial intelligence. Childhood allows for a protected period of broad, high-temperature search through the space of solutions and hypotheses, before the requirements of focused, goal-directed planning set in. This distinctive exploratory childhood intelligence, with its characteristic playfulness, imagination and variability, may be the key to the human ability to innovate creatively yet intelligently, an ability that is still far beyond the purview of AI. More generally, a genuine understanding of intelligence requires a developmental perspective.

ALISON GOPNIK is a developmental psychologist at UC Berkeley. Her books include The Philosophical Baby and, most recently, The Gardener and the Carpenter: What the New Science of Child Development Tells Us About the Relationship Between Parents and Children. Alison Gopnik's Edge Bio Page


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Collaboration and the Evolution of Disciplines

[7.1.19]

Cooperation achieves its beneficial effects by improving communication, promoting gains from specialization, enhancing organizational effectiveness, and reducing the risks of harmful conflict. Members of an institutionalized academic discipline jointly benefit in all these ways. Unfortunately, members of different disciplines typically do not. The boundaries of most disciplines were largely set 100 (plus or minus 50) years ago, and efforts to redraw the boundaries (e.g. at Irvine and Carnegie Mellon) have not been met with much success. I would like us to consider how the more or less fragmented research community can best respond to new opportunities (AI), new problems (climate change), new modes of education and governance, and new understandings of human behavior and values. 

ROBERT AXELROD, Walgreen Professor for the Study of Human Understanding at the University of Michigan, is best known for his interdisciplinary work on the evolution of cooperation. He is author of The Complexity of Cooperation and The Evolution of Cooperation. Robert Axelrod's Edge Bio Pag


 

Questioning the Cranial Paradigm

[6.19.19]

Part of the definition of intelligence is always this representation model. . . . I’m pushing this idea of distribution—homeostatic surfing on worldly engagements that the body is always not only a part of but enabled by and symbiotic on. Also, the idea of adaptation as not necessarily defined by the consciousness that we like to fetishize. Are there other forms of consciousness? Here’s where the gut-brain axis comes in. Are there forms that we describe as visceral gut feelings that are a form of human consciousness that we’re getting through this immune brain?

CAROLINE A. JONES is a professor of art history in the Department of Architecture at MIT and author, most recently, of The Global Work of Art. Caroline Jones's Edge Bio Page


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The Brain Is Full of Maps

[6.11.19]

 I was talking about maps and feelings, and whether the brain is analog or digital. I’ll give you a little bit of what I wrote:

Brains use maps to process information. Information from the retina goes to several areas of the brain where the picture seen by the eye is converted into maps of various kinds. Information from sensory nerves in the skin goes to areas where the information is converted into maps of the body. The brain is full of maps. And a big part of the activity is transferring information from one map to another.

As we know from our own use of maps, mapping from one picture to another can be done either by digital or by analog processing. Because digital cameras are now cheap and film cameras are old fashioned and rapidly becoming obsolete, many people assume that the process of mapping in the brain must be digital. But the brain has been evolving over millions of years and does not follow our ephemeral fashions. A map is in its essence an analog device, using a picture to represent another picture. The imaging in the brain must be done by direct comparison of pictures rather than by translations of pictures into digital form.

FREEMAN DYSON, emeritus professor of physics at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, has worked on nuclear reactors, solid-state physics, ferromagnetism, astrophysics, and biology, looking for problems where elegant mathematics could be usefully applied. His books include Disturbing the UniverseWeapons and HopeInfinite in All Directions, and Maker of PatternsFreeman Dyson's Edge Bio Page

 


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Perception As Controlled Hallucination

Predictive Processing and the Nature of Conscious Experience
[6.6.19]

Perception itself is a kind of controlled hallucination. . . . [T]he sensory information here acts as feedback on your expectations. It allows you to often correct them and to refine them. But the heavy lifting seems to be being done by the expectations. Does that mean that perception is a controlled hallucination? I sometimes think it would be good to flip that and just think that hallucination is a kind of uncontrolled perception. 

ANDY CLARK is professor of Cognitive Philosophy at the University of Sussex and author of Surfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action, and the Embodied MindAndy Clark's Edge Bio Page


 

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