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STEVEN
PINKER ON ROBERT TRIVERS
I'm
very pleased to hear that Edge is having
an event highlighting the work of Robert Trivers
on deceit and self-deception. I consider Trivers
one of the great thinkers in the history of Western
thought. It would not be too much of an exaggeration
to say that he has provided a scientific explanation
for the human condition: the intricately complicated
and endlessly fascinating relationships that
bind us to one another.
In an astonishing burst of creative brilliance, Trivers wrote
a series of papers in the early 1970s that explained each of
the five major kinds of human relationships: male with female,
parent with child, sibling with sibling, acquaintance with acquaintance,
and a person with himself or herself. In the first three cases
Trivers pointed out that the partial overlap of genetic interests
between individuals should, according to evolutionary biology,
put them in a conflict of psychological interest as well. The
love of parents, siblings, and spouses should be deep and powerful
but not unmeasured, and there should be circumstances in which
their interests diverge and the result is psychological conflict.
In the fourth case Trivers pointed out that cooperation between
nonrelatives can arise only if they are outfitted with certain
cognitive abilities (an ability to recognize individuals and
remember what they have done) and certain emotions (guilt, shame,
gratitude, sympathy, trust)—the core of the moral sense.
In the fifth case Trivers pointed out that all of us have a motive
to portray ourselves as more honorable than we really are, and
that since the best liar is the one who believes his own lies,
the mind should be "designed" by natural selection
to deceive itself.
These theories have inspired an astonishing amount of research
and commentary in psychology and biology—the fields of
sociobiology, evolutionary psychology, Darwinian social science,
and behavioral ecology are in large part attempt to test and
flesh out Trivers' ideas. It is no coincidence that E. O. Wilson's Sociobiology and
Richard Dawkins' The Selfish Gene were published in
1975 and 1976 respectively, just a few years after Trivers' seminal
papers. Both bestselling authors openly acknowledged that they
were popularizing Trivers' ideas and the research they spawned.
Likewise for the much-talked-about books on evolutionary psychology
in the 1990s—The Adapted Mind, The Red Queen, Born
to Rebel, The Origin of Virtue, The Moral Animal,
and my own How the Mind Works. Each of these books is
based in large part on Trivers' ideas and the explosion of research
they inspired (involving dozens of animal species, mathematical
and computer modeling, and human social and cognitive psychology).
But Trivers' ideas are, if such a thing is possible, even more
important than the countless experiments and field studies they
kicked off. They belong in the category of ideas that are obvious
once they are explained, yet eluded great minds for ages; simple
enough to be stated in a few words, yet with implications we
are only beginning to work out.
The
point that partial genetic overlap among individuals
leads to partial conflicts of interests in their
motives explains why human life is so endlessly
fascinating – why we love, and why we bicker
with those we love; why we depend on one another,
and why a part of us mistrusts the people we
depend on; why we know so much about ourselves,
but can't see ourselves as others see us; why
brilliant people do stupid things and evil men
are convinced of their rectitude. Trivers has
explained why our social and mental lives are
more interesting than those of bugs and frogs
and why novelists, psychotherapists, and philosophers
(in the old sense of wise commentators on the
human condition) will always have something to
write about.
Trivers is an under-appreciated genius. Social psychology should
be based on his theory, but the textbooks barely acknowledge
him. Even in his own field he has been overshadowed in the public
eye by those who have popularized his ideas. An Edge event
with other leading third culture thinkers focusing on his work
will be a major contribution, and begin to give this great mind
the acknowledgement it deserves.
Steven Pinker
Johnstone Family Professor
Department of Psychology
Harvard University
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A
FULL-FORCE STORM WITH GALE WINDS BLOWING
A Talk with Robert Trivers


Robert Trivers Edge Video Broadband | Modem
ROBERT
Trivers' scientific work has concentrated on two areas,
social theory based on natural selection (of which a theory
of self-deception is one part) and new work on selfish
genetic elements (which leads to certain kinds of internal
genetic conflicts). His early work—offering unifying
theories on reciprocal altruism, parental investment, sexual
selection, parent-offspring conflict, the sex ratio, and
deceit and self-deception—has now been cited more
than 7000 times in the scientific literature. His work
on selfish genetic elements has appeared in several articles.
He is the author of Social Evolution, Natural Selection and Social
Theory: Selected Papers of Robert Trivers.
Trivers
was cited in a special Time issue as one of the
100 greatest thinkers and scientists of the 20th Century.
Click
here for Robert Trivers' Edge Bio Page.
A
FULL-FORCE STORM WITH GALE WINDS BLOWING
(ROBERT
TRIVERS:) For
the last ten or fifteen years, I've been trying to understand
situations in nature in which the genes within a single
individual are in disagreement—or put differently,
in which genes within an individual are selected in conflicting
directions. It's an enormous topic, which 20 years ago
looked like a shadow on the horizon, just as about a hundred
years ago what later became relativity theory was just
two little shadows on the horizon of physics, and blew
up to become major developments. In genetics it's fair
to say that about 20 years ago a cloud on the horizon was
our knowledge that there were so-called selfish genetic
elements in various species that propagated themselves
at the expense of the larger organism. What was then just
a cloud on the horizon is now a full-force storm with gale
winds blowing.
An enormous amount of work is pouring out on this topic with an appreciation
that, far from being an unusual, rare exception, this is a minority phenomenon
in all organisms, including ourselves, and must by logic and by evidence
have been an important problem throughout the evolution of the genetic
system: namely, how to control and prevent the further spread of such
selfish elements. There's a dynamic relationship between these elements
and the rest of the organism—or, put in genetic terms, all the
other non-linked genes in the organism, which will tend to be selected
to suppress these elements, and will then select on the part of the elements
for further tricks in a co-evolutionary struggle.
The more we have worked on this the more it has seemed analogous to social
interactions at the level of individuals within groups. Some of the same
terms we find useful in the latter context, like cooperative, selfish,
spiteful, or altruistic behavior, can also be applied to genetic interactions
within the individual that run into conflict with each other. There can
be spiteful genes, there can be merely selfish genes, there is a whole
bunch of cooperative ones, and there are narrowly altruistic ones that
only help copies of themselves and not other non-linked genes. This is
a deep and important subject and we are, at last, becoming able to see
a unified whole and to relate the different parts to each other.
Genetics is extremely difficult, but it is also very rewarding. You get
an exactness out of genetics, beginning with Mendel's famous, quantitative
pea ratios. It's a quantitative, exact science that is very beautiful,
but it's also difficult to master. We've had a long, wonderful tradition
of learning an endless series of interesting and sometimes incredible
facts about the genetic systems of different organisms without having
a clear evolutionary logic for how natural selection works on the genetic
system itself. This is a major avenue into that problem.
There is also a personal irony for me in that some of those who were
most vitriolic against the social theory that I worked on in the 1970s
were population geneticists. I expect them to be equally, or perhaps
even more, displeased with this new development. Of course, that only
gives me greater satisfaction.
Incidentally, the enormity of the subject required me to get a collaborator
and I was very fortunate some twelve years ago to attract Austin Burt,
a brilliant Canadian evolutionary geneticist, now working at Imperial
College London.
I
have completed the genetics work and I am now eager to
do some work in psychology. The zeitgeist is such that
we are now in the process of putting together an evolutionary
psychology. As is often the case, the first hints of it
are people running around saying, "Evolutionary psychology
is coming! Evolutionary psychology is coming!" but
they haven't actually done much work to bring it on. Now
we're getting empirical work of increasingly high quality
on aspects of human psychology interpreted in an evolutionary
way.
The particular sub-area that I'm interested in developing myself has
to do with the structure of the mind in terms of biased information flow
between the conscious and the unconscious, and the very peculiar and
counter-intuitive fact that humans in a variety of situations misrepresent
reality to the conscious mind while keeping in the unconscious either
a fully accurate, or in any case more accurate, view of that which they
misrepresent to the conscious mind. That seems so counter-intuitive that
it begs explanation. You would have thought that after natural selection
ground away for four billion years and produced these eyeballs capable
of such subtlety—color, motion-detection, the details of granularity
that we see—you would have perfected the organs for interpretation
of reality such that they wouldn't systematically distort the information
once it reaches you. That seems like a strange way to design a railroad.
The function of this area of self-deception is intimately connected to
deception of others. If you are trying to see through me right now, and
if I'm lying about something you actually care about, what you see first,
to speak loosely, is my conscious mind and its behavioral effects. You
can get some sense of my mood or my affect. The quality of voice might
give you stress while trying to deceive you. It is much harder for you
to figure out what my unconscious is up to. You have to make a study
of my behavior, such as a spouse will do, much to your dismay at times.
One simple logic is that we hide things in our unconscious precisely
to hide them better from other people, so the key interaction driving
this is deception. I often talk about deceit and self-deception in the
same voice because you can't see self-deception properly if you don't
appreciate its deceptive possibilities. Likewise, if you talk about deception
without any reference to self-deception then you tend unconsciously to
limit yourself to consciously promoted deception, and you tend to overlook
unconsciously promulgated deception. Each failure to link the two topics
limits one's understanding of the topic under consideration.
There is also a new area within individual deception that is related
to this concept of self-deception directed towards others, but that has
not been worked out in a detailed way. That's the extraordinary finding
that our maternal genes and our paternal genes—that is, those we
inherited from our mother and those we inherited from our father—are
capable of being in conflict with each other, each acting to advance
the interest of the relevant parent and his or her relatives. You can
have a form of internal deception where the maternal side is over-representing
maternal interests which the paternal side is discounting, and vice versa.
~~
For
some reason I have had a deep interest in both deception
and self-deception way back from childhood. This, of course,
preceded my knowledge of evolutionary logic. In one episode
I remember my mother wagging her finger in my face, saying, "Remember
now, 'Judge not that ye be not judged.’” I
was raised in the Presbyterian Church and, of course, this
is from Matthew, who recorded Jesus saying, "Judge
not that ye be not judged, for with the judgment ye pronounce
shall ye be judged. And why are you worried about the mote
in your neighbor's eye? First take the beam out of your
own, the better to see the mote." It's an allegory
for self-deception. You're so busy saying what's wrong
with another person, you hypocrite. Get rid of what's wrong
with you first, and don't project it onto the other person.
That was a life-long meditation my mother gave me, so there
must have been something in my behavior.
The great evolutionist, Ernst Mayr, would say to me: "It's very
appropriate you're interested in self-deception, since you sure practice
a lot of it." At first I didn't know what to say, and then we (Huey
Newton and myself) came up with the notion that it's exactly the people
who are struggling with their self-deception that you'd expect to find
the problem interesting, and maybe make some progress on it. Those unafflicted
by it might have low insight and low motivation.
I also remember from my childhood that there was a prized item in a store
that had a lot of toys for children. I think it was a knife, but I know
it cost six dollars. I saved up six dollars plus the two cents for tax
back then, which took me a while under my father's regime of reimbursement
for yard work. I went into the store and gave them the $6.02, and the
man behind the counter said it cost seven dollars.
I said, "What are you talking about?" and he said, "It's
seven dollars. It says so on the sign right out in the window." I
said, "Nonsense, the sign says six dollars!"
We went around, he showed me the sign, and it says, $6.98, with the .98
written in small letters. I remember arguing with him, asking what sense
it made to misrepresent the cost of this by two pennies, so that you
have to do this extra addition. He said it's very common. I remember
walking around in a daze for weeks, looking at signs and thinking about
the amount of arithmetic that this was generating. A lot of times you
have to add the two pennies, because it actually matters, as in my own
sad case. I don't know if it changed my life, but I know I had an early
intense consciousness about the costs of deception, and also about the
importance of self-deception.
When I came to Harvard I ended up in U.S. history, after beginning as
a mathematics major. I left in despair and disgrace and was going to
be a lawyer, so you studied U.S. history. This was the early 1960s, while
the Vietnam disaster was just starting to take shape, and was produced
by Harvard people in JFK's cabinet. We were reading books like America,
Genius for Democracy or something like that. You didn't even have to
read the book since the title had the content. All of this U.S. history
was really self-glorification. I couldn't imagine devoting your life
to this kind of enterprise.
I had a breakdown as a junior, so I finally took a psychology course
as a senior. I couldn't believe that these people were pretending to
have a science when all they had was a series of competing guesses for
how human beings developed. There were learning psychologists, depth
or Freudian psychologists, and social psychologists. It wasn't a unified
discipline, it had no unifying paradigm, and it was not hooked up to
an underlying science—i.e., biology—just as biology sits
on chemistry, which sits on physics. I thought it was hopeless and went
away. When I learned evolutionary logic and then animal behavior, which
I was assigned to learn and then render for children, I realized that
the basis for psychology is evolutionary logic. The value of animal behavior
is that you cast your net more widely.
My mental breakdown prevented me from getting into Yale for law school,
and created problems with my fallback position at the University of Virginia.
I decided not to go to there because I didn't like how they were handling
the medical records that they insisted they had to have. I happened,
instead, to get a job writing and illustrating children's books for the
new social sciences, which followed the new math and the new physics,
which followed Sputnik in 1957. That was our attempt to catch up with
the Soviets in science, and then in social science. The reason you probably
never heard of it was because the whole course was killed by a set of
southern congressmen back then, because it was alleged that we taught
(1) sex education (we had pictures of animals copulating), (2) evolution
by natural selection as fact (which was true) and cultural relativity
(i.e. respect for other cultures). The whole thing was killed, but it
introduced to me to evolutionary logic.
It was a marvelous company and a beautiful setup in retrospect. The company
allowed you to do a lot of reading right there in the office to learn
what you needed to know. In my case they assigned a biologist named Bill
Drury from the Massachusetts Audubon Society who both assigned papers
in the library on a given topic—like my first book on the caribou
and its predators—and then critiqued them for me. He was paid $75
an hour in 1966, which is at least two or three hundred dollars an hour
now. For an academic or the head of the Massachusetts Audubon Society
that's some sweet money, so I had the ideal situation where you could
consume two more hours of your teacher's time with no guilt at all. This
meant that I had a private tutor in biology, paid for by my employer
for two years.
He took me to see Ernst Mayr to try to talk me into being a graduate
student. I came out of mathematics where if you haven't done any math
by the time you're 23, it's very unlikely that you are going to be a
mathematician. I thought that to be a biologist I should have been studying
insects from the time I was four, but Drury would just say that whenever
you ask a biologist an interesting question, he won't know the answer.
When Drury took me to see Mayr, I liked right away that Ernst had a small
office off of the bigger office of his secretary. He had his own private
office elsewhere, but as head of the Museum of Comparative Zoology he
occupied a little space and she occupied the bigger space. He told me
about Dick Estes, who at 38 had gone back to school in biology, and had
just finished a good thesis on the wildebeest. He was very encouraging.
Then there was a funny moment when he said, "Who do you want to
work with?"
I didn't know anything, so I said Konrad Lorenz. He read my personality
right and said, "He's too authoritarian for you. That isn't gonna
work. Who else?"
I said, "What about Niko Tinbergen?"
And he said, "He's only repeating now in the '60s what he already
showed in the '50s."
I'm a relatively quick learner, so I said, "Well what do you suggest,
Professor Mayr?"
I'll never forget his hands, going in a wide circle, as he said, "What
about Harvard?"
And what about Harvard, indeed? They had a marvelous museum with all
these fossils and pinned insects. They didn't have any animal behaviorists,
but my teacher, Drury, who was a behaviorist, convinced me that that
was even an advantage. He said, "Why would you want to take a course
on field methodology and learn how to put a band on a bird, which you
can learn better in the field from a teacher. What you want to learn
is evolutionary biology." Irv DeVore would have allowed me to come
straight in as a graduate student in anthropology. If I had done that
I wouldn't have had to borrow a bunch of money and take a year of courses
in biology, but I knew that would have been a very short-sighted decision.
I knew all the ideas and the power were coming out of biology, so that's
what I should learn.
I had had no chemistry either, so Ernst suggested that I take chemistry
at night school at Boston University, since it's too hard at Harvard.
I did everything Ernst told me, so although I was working this job, at
5 o'clock I'd bicycle to Boston University and took one semester of chemistry.
In the second semester I had an opportunity to finish the course or to
watch caribou in the Arctic for a month. I thought that such a trip was
more valuable to my long-term development than second semester chemistry.
Incidentally, I avoided chemistry entirely. I'm one of the few Ph.D.'s
in this country who's never had a course in organic chemistry because
you cannot get a bachelor's in this country without an organic degree.
I don't have a bachelor's.
When I came to Harvard you had to take a whole series of mini-tests.
There were 16 of them – physics, math, botany, chemistry, etc.
Naturally I failed. When the prescription committee met, it was stacked
with evolutionists and Ernst was the head. He insisted that the committee
not only prescribe me organic chemistry—that is, that I couldn't
get my Ph.D. unless I passed that with a B or better—but also prescribed
me a knowledge of biochemistry because that's the payoff for organic
chemistry. The argument got hot, and I tried to intercede at one moment
until I realized, "This has nothing to do with you. Shut up and
sit back." Finally Mayr says, "By God, I agree with you! We
should not prescribe organic unless we prescribe biochem, and since we
will not prescribe biochem we will also not prescribe organic." He
put it up to a vote and it came back 5 to 2. It was as if the heavens
had opened and the Lord himself smiled at me and said, "You are
my chosen one." Then he leaned across the table and said to me, "But
Bob, we strongly urge you to take organic chemistry." And I said, "Professor
Mayr, I'm already signed up for the course," which I was. I sold
the book that afternoon and burned the little Tinker toys you had to
buy.
I came to Harvard originally as a special student who had never had biology.
That fall I was taking a course in cell biology, a course in invertebrate
biology, and a botany course. I used to sit in my bed at night with these
biology books and a dictionary trying to figure it out—and I used
to have “word salad” dreams for a couple of months: “the
cnidoblast of the intestinal cells of the apple’s pollen” and
so on After two or three months the subjects all separated cleanly into
their separate sub areas, and it wasn't so bad.
The guy who really got me focused properly was Richard Lewontin, a geneticist
who hated my work, helped make sure that Harvard didn't give me tenure
right away when I wanted it, and will undoubtedly hate my genetics work.
Dick Lewontin came to Harvard when I was a first-year graduate student
in 1969 to give a talk on the new methodology of isozyme work that John
Hubby had worked out. That was the first DNA technology that would allow
you to do paternity analysis. It was not so much nailing down who your
real father was that was exciting to us biologists, but the fact that
you could quantify the degree of genetic variation in nature. I was introduced
to the guy ahead of time by Ed Wilson, and he dumped all over me because
of a nasty paper I'd written about some mathematical ecologists. I took
an instant dislike to him—he had a rather arrogant style—and
I was packed in this room hoping he would fall flat on his face. He was
introduced by Mayr and gave a superb talk. My joke is that at the end
he flipped his chalk 30 feet in the air and caught it in his breast pocket;
he didn't really do that, but he might as well have. Everything else
was in place, including intellectual content and showmanship.
Halfway through the talk I was feeling an intense, internal pain, because
although I disliked him he was doing a great job. I did some quick thinking
and realized that there was no future in this negative paper I'd written
on mathematic ecology. I had no positive thoughts on the subject, nor
did I have the talents that would make that area pay off in my life,
so I decided to do no more work on it. I was tempted to write it up because
the Harvard professors wanted me to nail some people they disliked, but
I decided not to waste any more time on it.
It was clear to me during Lewontin's talk that if the work was as bad
as I said it was, then my critique, if it was published, would disappear
from sight along with their work, like a barnacle on a whale. The only
value comes if you have something positive to do, and it is important
to match both your own interests and abilities to what you decide to
work on. I often wonder how many scientists end up spending five or ten
years in mathematical ecology because of some accident of a paper they
wrote. They never quite see that they've been running around in the woods
for 30 years, and have no intuitions of any use about the way nature
is set up. I was also too lazy to learn any new mathematics, but I was
blessed with a certain degree of psychological and social insight, and
had been very interested in these issues from an early age. That is analogous
to running around in the woods for 30 years, if you're going to sit down
and write social theory.
I asked myself, "What ideas do you have that are worth developing?" I
started thinking about the obvious concept, "If you scratch my back
I'll scratch yours," and began to wonder about how to make reciprocal
altruism work in an evolutionary way, stating the argument in a form
that didn't limit it to humans. That was worth throwing some time into.
Bill Drury was an ornithologist and had told me to watch pigeons. From
watching them every night I knew they had a double standard. During the
day males obsessed about the chance that another male might get in there
with his female. But at the same time that male is hustling other females
whenever he gets a chance. Out of this came a general theory for the
evolution of sex differences, parental investment in sexual selection.
The paper that developed out of this has been cited more than 4,000 times,
because much work on sex differences, on role, style, and all the behavioral
stuff, refers back to that original paper, especially if they cite the
concept of parental investment. It actually appears to be cited more
often per month now than earlier in its life.
People have asked me about the connection between deceit and self-deception
in evolutionary biology. Certainly I was conscious of deception right
away, and my teacher Bill Drury was very helpful. I might easily have
had an inferior teacher who was unconscious of the degree of deception
in other animals. Then I might have made the mistake some biologists
did of talking as if we're the only deceiving creatures and therefore
this trait has to do with language. I knew from early on that it was
much more general, and probably I learned that from Bill.
People have pointed out to me that in my very first paper on reciprocal
altruism, there's argumentation that refers to keeping the feeling unconscious
so as not to have it detected. My first consciousness of this occurred
when I went on a field trip to India and Africa with Irv DeVore, Harvard's
celebrated baboon man. I had a brainstorm for a couple of weeks, and
ended up in a hospital for ten days afterwards. I thought about hardly
anything other than parent-offspring conflict and deceit and self-deception.
Some of it, in retrospect, was fruitless efforts to map Freud onto parent-offspring
conflict and deceit and self-deception, whose deeper ramifications I
was just appreciating. In later years I came to think it was worthless,
that it was better to start without Freud and certainly not go through
the genuflections that Freudians seem addicted to.
The joke on me is that I never developed it. I was supposed to give a
paper on the logic of self-deception in 1978 at a conference put on by
the Royal Society in London. I wrote an abstract, which was published.
I came across it several years ago and said, "I would like to read
that paper." Back then I was young and strong and could write an
abstract eight months before I was due to give a talk and just plan to
fill in the blanks, but I haven't worked out the details of some of those
assertions in that abstract yet. It's just floating around there. I never
gave the paper partly because my wife was about to give birth to twins,
but more particularly because the Royal Society would only fly you as
far as England. I guess the assumption is that once you get there, why
would you want to leave? I was very sensitive to financial exploitation
of academics, which is rife. It certainly was at Harvard, where we were
grossly underpaid as junior faculty, so I tended never to do something
whose financial arrangements I didn't like.
I never went there, never gave the talk, never developed the paper, and
that's a great shame, because one of the virtues of thinking a topic
through to some degree of development is that you will generate a literature
which will come back and illuminate the topic for yourself. Even if you're
thinking in purely self-interested terms and write a paper on reciprocal
altruism, there's a huge literature now on the subject. Only part of
it is generated from that paper, but still a good part was generated
from that paper, and I learned back from it. I often think of the paper
not written and the literature that did not develop, especially as I
sat down at the end of the '90s and wrote a quickie paper on self-deception
to try to bring the field up to date. I was staggered at how little progress
had been made since the last time I looked at the subject 20 years before.
That was the cost of never writing a paper. It didn't need to be as elemental
or as important as some of the other ones, but just writing it to put
it on other people's laps would have generated a response.
I was very fortunate. Lewontin once referred to me to a bunch of graduate
students as an intellectual opportunist. He meant that to be negative,
but I laughed. What else makes sense in this short life? I was an intellectual
opportunist. All of these social topics remain undeveloped because of
this species advantage "paradigm" that had lain over the field
like a human blanket. Reciprocal altruism, parental investment, sexual
selection, sex ratio of offspring, parent-offspring conflict were all
topics that were sitting there waiting to be developed. I just grabbed
the chance.
But I had to get away from Harvard. I was a graduate student at Harvard
from 1968 to 1972, then I started teaching at Harvard in 1973, until
1978. I was not denied tenure, I just needed more money for what I was
doing which was lecturing to 530 students, with 12 graduate students
as teaching assistants, and so on. Most of the junior faculty at Harvard
taught 15 to 20 students in an undergraduate class and four in a graduate
class. They weren't being eaten alive. Harvard wasn't paying me enough
to replenish what was being taken out of me biologically. Never mind
not being paid enough to have any reproductive success of my own.
There were two factors at work. First, no one knew about my work, which
was really nice. It's good to be flying underneath everyone's radar,
and then publish a paper that you know is important. But with Ed Wilson's
sociobiology, which embraced some of my ideas, the proverbial you-know-what
hit the fan, and there was a political stink. People were very upset
then. The Vietnam War was still going on, for God's sake, in 1975, and
people were very politically conscious and pseudo-conscious. So I became
very well known. That was ego-distorting. And then I was at Harvard,
which is a separate kind of ego-distorting environment, just because
Harvard professors can't help being full of themselves.
I had been in Cambridge 17 years, 15 of them at Harvard with two years
off for good behavior, that was between the undergraduate years and the
going back as a special student. So I had to leave Harvard—if only
to air out my psyche, but I did not have to pick UC Santa Cruz, perhaps
the second worst school in its class in the country. Lord, what a place.
It was a very, very bad fit for me, and a dreadful 16 years. Thank God
I came back east.
I intend to throw myself full time into deceit and self-deception now.
It's a topic that I've been conscious of in an evolutionary way for at
least 30 years. I've published bits and pieces throughout the years.
I used to get up and joke that I was embarrassed lecturing on it because
I've been practicing it for the last 30 years instead of thinking about
it. I don't like to get up and give that joke any more. I want to get
completely on top of the subject, and I want to do a major piece on it.
And I don't want it to be just for an academic crowd, because the topic
is everywhere. It's in every human being's life, and anybody who's half
conscious is aware of it in others and themselves. One cannot read the
newspaper without being conscious of the importance of deceit and self-deception
in national and international affairs.
I have the free time now to do whatever I am flying underneath the radar.
I work much better in a much humbler posture, where people basically
don't know who I am, or if they do it doesn't mean any particular thing
to them. I'm not invited a lot of places. Otherwise I would have my time
eaten up, but I'm not in that situation. I can throw myself with full
energy into it, and I really plan to.
I'm particularly excited with the fact that almost every month neurophysiology
is coming out with a result of direct relevance to the topic of self-deception.
The psychologists have invented skillful new techniques at getting at
pre-conscious or unconscious processes that are very exciting. There
is an empirical scientific world that's building up now that did not
exist 20 years ago, and that can constrain and guide our thinking.
I sometimes contrast this topic to genetics. Genetics, as I mentioned,
is intrinsically difficult, but it is exact. If you take the energy and
the time to master it you will get rewards for it. You will actually
know real things and be able to point to it and know what you're talking
about. Deceit and self-deception by their nature are topics that tend
to be hidden from view. They are difficult to pinpoint, even as to how
you define them. What is the evidence that it happened? It's a very different
kind of intellectual problem than genetics. It's much easier to master
what's known, because in scientific terms not an awful lot is known.
But if you have to think carefully in terms of the logical distinctions
you make, there is now an emerging body of empirical data that, as I
say, can constrain your thinking and guide it. If you're not constrained,
the topic is too big and the possibilities are too great. You have to
be able to say, no, we're going to exclude this half, or this two-fifths
of reality because of this result, and we think this is where things
are important, because the data point in that direction.
The time is ripe, although it would be riper five to ten years from now.
Academics are always saying this is the perfect study area for this,
the perfect species to do that, or the perfect time for this book. Well,
this isn't the perfect time, but at the very least it will point people
towards relevant empirical work. It's a function of how much actual thinking
you do. Like everything else, this is not a topic where seat-of-the-pants
thinking, or a few polished anecdotes, no matter how amusing, are going
to carry the day. The topic has got to be thought through, carefully
and systematically and I am ripe to do it.
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