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Twentieth-Century
Cases
The
key role of historic memory in the success of Type II terror acts becomes
immediately clear when we consider the particular part of modern historic
memory that refers to actual traumatic happenings which disrupted the
familiar environment of human life.
The chief example that comes to mind is of course the release
over Hiroshima and Nagasaki of artificial, man-made suns that rained
down heat, gamma rays, and radioactive fallout an injection of
a new, essentially cosmological object into the ecology of human experience. Secretary of War Stimson
accurately observed to the members of his scientific panel advising
on the use of the bomb on 31 May 1945, prior to its first test over
Alamogordo, that they should consider the atomic bomb not "as a
new weapon merely but as creating a revolutionary change in the relation
of man to the universe."[4] More than even most of the scientists present, Stimson seems
to have realized early that the weapon was outside the normal frame
of causality, not only of the intended victims but also of the victors.
The use of the atomic bomb is a classic case of successful traumatization
by Type II terrorism. But
the historic memory contains other examples that share some of the same
parameters, even if not the same scale or duration of effect.
Thus in some quarters, the impact of the injection in October
1957 of a new artificial moon, Sputnik, was near-hysteria, the more
so as the object had been made in a country thought to be threatening,
and (as far as the public was concerned) was made in secret.
A more relevant case was that of the replacement of natural air
by a deadly gas produced by the Germans in World War I.
The Allies were initially terrified, but they soon absorbed the
weapon into their own war plans.
Thus, as noted by Gilbert F. Wittemore, Jr., by March of 1918
the United States research group had developed a simple and efficient
process for the production of the large supplies of mustard gas that
had been ordered by the United States military in September 1917.
"By the time of the armistice, the Edgewood plant was producing
30 tons of mustard gas a day.
Chemists later pointed with pride to this accomplishment, noting
that it was not their fault that these vast quantities of gas had not
been fired in American shells.
The gas had been ready and waiting: the army had failed to provide
the artillery shells.[5]
The case, and the condition of non-use in Western society since, illustrate
a maxim that state-controlled terror weapons lead to proliferation, just as do other weapons, but that there may then
ensue a balance of terror that peculiar state in which each side
exhibits the behavior of both terrorizer and victim.
The historic consciousness of our time contains also another case that
future historians may put on the list of developments that uniquely
characterize the twentieth century.
I refer to the discovery by the civilized world, at the end of
World War II, of the existence of the Nazi camps for genocide
or, more properly, of final proof that bore out the evidence long available
to those who cared to know. The process by which these concentration
camps were used systematically to destroy specially selected and identified
groups of the population under German domination was calculated to serve
a triple purpose.
Not only were the camps designed to eliminate people. They also were factories to "harvest"
them methodically, rapidly, and on a huge scale. Nothing in the exhibit area of Auschwitz
has been more shattering than the carefully sorted, huge piles of eye
glasses, shaving brushes, trusses, children's wear, human hair, and
so forth, the last of such shipments to the German homeland, abandoned
when the camp was liberated. (It
is a small part of the evidence of the involvement of large numbers
of people in the transport and other aspects of the undertaking.)
But it is generally overlooked that a third purpose of the camps was
precisely that they would act also as a terror weapon.
Certainly, at least the segment of the population that was the
target of these camps was sufficiently aware of their existence, and
consequently was traumatized by the threat to such an extent that the
vast operation in which millions were killed could be carried on with
considerable efficiency in terms of manpower needs.[6]
The existence of the Gulag in the Soviet Union was more generally known
within the country; the disappearance of millions forced into those
camps also had a paralyzing effect on the psyche of most in the population
at large although with splendid exceptions.
The
use of systematic state terror in what became the Soviet Union has been
most authoritatively described by Richard Pipes in his book, The
Russian Revolution (Alfred A. Knopf,
1990). Chapter 18, "The Red Terror,"
traces its early stages to Lenin's writings, as in an essay of 1908,
where he first used the concept of "extermination" of class
enemies. Once in power, the Bolshevik dictatorship
made terror part of its state policy. Lenin's Commissar of Justice wrote in 1920: "Terror is a system...a legalized plan of the regime for the purpose of
mass intimidation, mass compulsion, mass extermination," all directed
to segments of the state's own population.
Eventually, the Soviet security police were given a free hand
to end the lives of millions of citizens that it regarded as "enemies." Concentration camps, called by that name,
had been first ordered to be set up by Trotzky and Lenin in August 1918,
as part of the "Red Terror."
By 1923, there were 315 such camps. In the Stalinist U.S.S.R., they grew ever larger and more numerous.
This is not the place to pursue this particular legacy of that tragic
century to world history. But
in the absence of any agreements, incentives, or other forces that would
tend to discourage continued development and use of terror of both types,
we may expect the tacit taboo on this particular Type II terror weapon
to be overcome also. The campaigns of "ethnic cleansing,"
e.g., in Serbia and Rwanda,
came close to this model in recent years.
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4 Quoted in Martin J. Sherwin, A World
Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975), pp. 204-205.
5 Gilbert F. Wittemore, Jr.
"World War I, Poison Gas Research, and the Ideal of American
Chemists," Social Studies of Science 5
(1975): 151.
6 The same theme of efficiency is found in
the detailed operations of the camps. Thus, I have seen in the archives in Auschwitz
records of experimental research to determine the number of calories
needed in the food supply to keep the average inmate not so weak as
to be unable to work in the labor sections of the camp, nor so strong
as to survive for more than some nine months at the outset. Moreover, when the available food supply was tuned to this
particular aim, camp inmates could be persuaded to do a great deal
for relatively small favors (e.g., being rewarded by scooping a ladleful
of soup from the bottom of the kettle, where there might be some potatoes,
rather than from the top). Thus
the camps were policeable with less manpower.
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